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THE RIGHT OF PROTEST AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE t
HARRoP A. FREEMAN t
For the past ten years lawyers and society generally have become
aware of a technique of challenging government action or policy. Vari-
ously styled as sit-ins, wade-ins, teach-ins, preach-ins, protest marches,
all use the bodies of individuals to call attention to an issue and work for
legal change. It is important that we understand these methods and try
to orient them into our system of law. The Negro rights and the student
anti-war movements (which in most respects is one movement) probably
constitute the most important new moral-political force in America since
the Granger-Progressive-Labor movements laid the foundations for the
New Deal. The present movement evidences the yearnings of man at
mid-20th century; it is anti-war, anti-injustice, equalitarian, non-violent.
It is the young seeking to avoid political alienation and find a fulcrum
for political leverage; it is the education community attempting to play
its proper role in a developing society.
Many of the popular assumptions surrounding our title are miscon-
ceptions. The protest action is often not civil disobedience but in fact
"obedience" (the leader of the second Oakland march called it "massive
civil obedience"). The total pattern is in the democratic tradition rather
than anarchic or totalitarian (it claims to be an expression of free speech).
The theory is not anti-law but within the law. As will be seen later,
much of the technique goes back to Gandhi who as a lawyer hammered
out his pattern as a means of effectuating change within the law when
law's normal procedures were inadequate or held captive by anti-legal
forces, thus bringing about necessary change in a democratic, consensual,
non-violent way.
In any discussion of challenge to the State, its laws and its policies,
-'An original paper on Civil Disobedience was presented by Professor Freeman at
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, and this
was made the basis of a week-long symposium, November 5-12, 1965. The results of
that paper and symposium are being published by the Center in its regular series.
t The author is Professor of Law at Cornell University Law School, Ithaca, New
York, and was on leave to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions for the
fall term, 1965.
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we commonly hear such terms as the following: (1) non-resistance,
(2) passive resistance, (3) non-violent resistance, (4) super-resistance,
(5) non-violent non-cooperation, (6) non-violent direct action, (7) civil
disobedience, (8) non-violent coercion, (9) war or revolution without
violence, (10) Satyagraha or soul force, (11) pacifism. I take item (1)
to stand by itself; items (2), (3), (4), and (5) to stand together; items
(6), (7), (8), and (9) to be in the same spirit; and items (10) and (11)
to be essentially similar. An attempt will be made in the next section to
discuss the characteristics of these various groupings.
There is another set of terms underlying the total discussion: Force,
Coercion, Violence, Resistance. Force we may define as physical power
to effect change in the material or immaterial world.1 Coercion is the
use of either physical or intangible force to compel action contrary to the
will of the individual or group subjected to the force. Violence is the
willful application of force in such a way that it is physically injurious
to the person or group against which it is applied. Resistance is any
opposition either physical or psychological to the will or action of an-
other; it is the defensive counterpart of coercion. That is the way most
people conversant in the area use the terms.2
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ON THE SPECTRUM OF NON-VIOLENCE
Because I believe that the current civil rights and anti-war protests
involve persons whose acceptance and practice of non-violent protest is
grounded in every shade of thought, I deem it essential that we under-
stand the total non-violent pattern. If we could llot a spectrum from
violence without hate at one extreme to active goodwill and reconcilia-
1. I, personally, enjoy SIMONE WEns beautiful little book, THE ILIAD, OR, THfE
PoEM OF FORcE, wherein she says:
The center of the Iliad is force. Force employe( by man, force that
enslaves man, force before which man's flesh shrinks away. In this work, at
times, the human spirit is shown as modified by its relations with force, as
swept away, blinded, by the very force it imagined it could handle, as deformed
by the weight of the force it submits to.
To define force-it is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into
a thing. Exercised to the limit, it turns man into a thirg in the most literal
sense: it makes a corpse out of him. Somebody was here, and the next minute
there is nobody here at all; this is a spectacle the Iliad never wearies of showing
us:
• . . the horses
Rattled the empty chariots through the files of battle,
Longing for their noble drivers. But they on the ground
Lay, dearer to the vulture than to their wives.
2. PAULLIN, INTRODUCTION TO NoN-VIOLENCE (1943).
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tion (pacifism) at the other, civil disobedience would fall close to the
median:
Pacificism-Active Goodwill and Reconciliation
Non-Resistance
Satyagraha or Non-Violent Direct Action
Civil Disobedience
Non-Violent Coercion
Non-Violence by Necessity
Violence Without Hate
It is very likely that in different situations those primarily falling in one
category will use other means, particularly means lower on the scale.
It would seem that we use the term "civil disobedience" in our
present discussion as characteristic of the total spectrum for two reasons:
(1) because it is the median term, and (2) because in the word "dis-
obedience" is found the problem hardest for society to accept-the chal-
lenge to law. Let us briefly examine the spectrum.
Violence Without Hate. Almost everyone recognizes that on occa-
sion a man who genuinely abhors violence confronts an almost insuffer-
able evil, and yet he may feel that the only means of opposing that evil
is by violence, which is itself evil.3 Abraham Lincoln may be taken as
an example of this spirit in the use of violence.
Non-Violence by Necessity. Persons or groups who would gladly
use arms or violence against opponents often use non-violent means
because they have none other available. Sometimes this may even be
"hate without violence." The non-violence is expediency, not principle;
it is negative (defensive) rather than positive. Much Negro activity
over the past 100 years in the South is of this type. The non-violent
resistance of the occupied countries (Denmark, Norway, France, North
Africa) to the Nazis is another.' Or note the five or six major Chinese
3. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SocIETY (1932).
4. See, C. H. W. Hasselriis, "Nothing Rotten in Denmark," New Republic, June 7,
1943, 108:760-61; Free World, July, 1943, p. 6, Col. 77. Hitler recognized this often.
See his New Year's Proclamation, 1944.
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boycotts between 1906 and 1919.'
Nonz-Violent Coercion. Now we come to people having a choice
who use non-violence to modify the conduct of others to promote their
own interests or ideals. The strike, boycott or other acts of non-coopera-
tion are the recognized weapons. These may seem to be non-coercive
because they are mere abstentions. But they are coercive. Under modern
conditions the "power structure" against which the resistance is directed
must have the cooperation of the resisting group to survive. The non-
cooperation compels power (which thought it had such absolute control
as to prevent effective dissent) to make concessions, even against its will.
The movement has a two pronged attack: to touch the conscience of the
"masters" and make them listen, and to recruit the support of disinterested
onlookers for the "underdog." The Labor Strike, as conceived by Eu-
gene Debs and used in the 1930's is an excellent example (the "sit-in"
so effectively used by the civil and Negro rights movements originated
in the 1936-37 "sit down strike" in which the worker refused to leave
his workbench). Strikes have often had extensive and profound political
significance.'
Civil Disobedience. This has much the same purpose as non-violent
coercion, relies on some of the same techniques, is grounded in much the
same theory as non-violent coercion (it is also allied to its other com-
panions on the spectrum-Satyagraha or non-violEnt direct action and
pacifism). It has one distinguishing characteristic: it is against a specific
law or act of the State having the effect of law, which is disobeyed; and
the law is that of the state having jurisdiction of the protestor. In a very
real sense, therefore, civil disobedience is civil non-violent resistance or
coercion just as we speak of "civil" war.
Let us examine a few other characteristics of civil disobedience used
in its limited or proper sense: (1) "Civil" is not used in contradistinction
to "criminal" (for some civil disobedience is indicted as criminal), but
it is used as "against the state, the civil, the civitas." (2) It is an "in-
5. CASE, NO N-VIOLENT CoRcIoN 330-39 (1923).
6. In 1920 British transport workers refused to handle goods to be used against
the socialist regime in Russia; the British general strike of 1926 was called off because
of its tremendous revolutionary implications; in 1920 a Germam general strike defeated
the Kapp Putsch, an attempt of the militarists to seize control of the State; in 1924,
when the French army invaded the Ruhr, the non-cooperation of the miners led to the
famous expression, "You can't mine coal with bayonets." The list could be extended
indefinitely. See, also, NIETTELS, THE Roots oF AmErIcAN, CIvILIZATION 630-35 (1938) :
The American colonies opposed the Stamp Act of 1765 and the Townshend Duties of
1767 by "non-importation agreements." This boycott compelled the repeal of the Stamp
Act of 1766 and the Townshend Duties in 1770. The "Continental Association" formed
by the Continental Congress in 1774 was to continue this no a-violent revolution. The
"Boston Tea Party" was typical non-violent action, but the radicals gathered arms and
produced Lexington and Concord.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tentional" act, a chosen course, not occasioned by accident. (3) It is used
for an external purpose (to call attention to injustice, to change condi-
tions). (4) It is non-violent, at least in origin. (5) It is a form of
communication and asserts that it is within the theory of the first amend-
ment. (6) It is used by those who are in fact barred from otherwise
exerting power. (7) It may be legal or illegal. Civil disobedience may
have a religious philosophy. When it does have a religious philosophy,
it borders on pacifism. There is adequate religious justification, in addi-
tion to theories of natural law, for those who want to use it.
7
Satyagraha or Non-Violent Direct Action. Gandhi has recorded
for us both the empirical and the theoretical bases of Satyagraha' Gand-
dhi, the young lawyer, went to South Africa in 1893 to represent the
Indian community, against which discrimination and discriminatory laws
were rife. Unable to achieve his end in the courts, he established Tolstoy
Farm and the Natal Indian Congress which conducted boycotts, strikes
and other non-cooperative activity. Under assault and arrest he gradually
developed theories of Ahima and Satyagraha to explain his actual
practice.9
The term "Satyagraha" was coined by Gandhi in about 1906 to avoid
the connotation of weakness. He combined the Gujerati words Sat or
truth with Agraha meaning firmness, to give us "truth force" or "soul
force." Gandhi was influenced by the Hindu philosophy of ahimsa (the
idea that the most effective sacrifice was self-sacrifice and suffering
while refusing to injure others), by the Sermon on the Mount, and by
the writings of Tolstoy and Thoreau. Shridharani treats Satyagraha
rather like "moral jujitsu," listing thirteen steps in a Satyagraha cam-
paign.10
7. See, the discussion herein of Pacifism, and Freeman, A Remonstrance for
Conscience, 106 U. oF PA. L. REv. 806 (1958).
8. See, GANDI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE (1951); SHRIDIIARANI, WAR WITHOUT
VIOLEN CE (1939) ; BONDURANT, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE (1958)'
9. Id. The climax of the struggle came in 1913 when 2,000 Indians marched into
the Transvaal; the treatment they received and the forbearance they showed swung
public opinion, a commission was appointed and most of the discriminatory laws were
repealed. In 1914 on return to India, Gandhi led a mill workers' strike in Ahmedabad.
He had long believed that "Swaraj" or self-rule was due for India and he undertook
to lead this political movement along non-violent lines. The history of this movement,
giving rise to Indian independence in 1947, is well known and will not be repeated. In
one of his first Indian strikes Gandhi used fasting to "purify himself and the strikers ;"
the efficacy of the fast was proved by obtaining desired results in three days; he used
fasts in 1919, 1924, 1932, 1933, 1939, 1943, 1945, 1946-47.
10. SHRIDHARANI, op. cit. supra note 8. The first step is negotiation and arbitra-
tion; the second is "agitation" to educate the people on the issues and gain solidarity for
later stages. If "moral suasion . . . proved ineffective the Satyagrahis do not hesitate
to shift their technique to compulsive force." Later steps thus include mass demon-
strations, strikes, boycotts, non-cooperation, civil disobedience, setting up parallel govern-
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Non-Resistance. The largest and most significant group of non-
resistants are the Mennonites, who grew out of the Anabaptist movement,
literally following the Sermon on the Mount "resist not evil," and effect-
uating a complete separation of church and state (in theory removing
themselves from all state functions). The most -iamous non-resistant
writers were Tolstoy (anarchist), Adam Ballou (New England Non-
Resistance Society) and William Lloyd Garrison (abolitionist, reformer).
The shadings here between non-violent direct action, non-resistance and
pacifism become quite hazy.
Pacifism--Active Goodwill, Reconciliation, A Way of Life. There
is a sense in which "pacifism" is a political movement-the opposition
to a war-power politics. This is the way in which the term is usually
used by the outsider, the non-initiate. It may be called revolutionary
secular pacifism. It has a political philosophy of five tenets:"
Violence hinders the achievement of a democratic and peaceful
order.
M'vodern states are built on violence and only revolution can
effect a pacifist order.
This revolution must develop and employ a technique embodying
a non-violent ethic.
Decentralization in politics and the economic order is sought.
The ideology of non-violence has a direct relevance to politics.
Pacifism for most pacifists is much more than this-it is religious,
a philosophy and way of total life, from which opposition to war and
activity in politics are by-products.'2
Let me try to make the philosophy more exact and more personal.
All great religions seek to lay down two great commandments (and I
would add that these are good modern psychology) : (1) To be a full man
and in harmony with creation or the Creator one must live fully in body,
mind and psyche or spirit-there is no indication that one of these is
greater than the other. (2) In order to do this one must learn to love
himself and only then can he similarly love all others or "neighbors."
The presentment goes on: a) there is a piece of the Creator, creativity,
ment and divorcing it and selves from the old government. These are used to compel,
not merely to persuade.
11. POLITICAL TnEoPims OF MODERN PACIFISM, PACIFIST RESEARCii BUREAU (1944).
12. The foreword to all Pacifists Research Bureau Booklets states it thus: . . .
• . . The word is used in the name, The Pacifist Research Bureau, to refer to
the philosophy that man should exercise such respect for human personality that
he will employ only love and sacrificial good will in overcoming evil and aiding
fulfillment, and that the purpose of all human interrelation and endeavor will
be the creation of a [world) brotherhood in which cooperative effort con-
tributes to the good of all.
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uniqueness, in every individual; b) only as each fulfills his uniqueness
is God or creativity living in the world; c) interrelations between persons
must provide for the creativity of each to grow, mature and express it-
self; d) any relationship which is exploitative-economically, sexually,
intellectually, emotionally, politically-is wrong; e) power tends to be
expIoitative; f) love-warm understanding, kindly, trusting, daring-
(and if necessary suffering) is the "power" which moves non-exploita-
tively; g) the ultimate exploitation is killing a man, for you transform a
creative human into a thing-no one can recreate him; h) the destruction
of a man is therefore the killing of creativity, of God; i) therefore, I am
a pacifist. All fall short of the ideal, yet the ideal remains.
The pacifist will use, presumably, appropriate means and seek ends
in harmony with this philosophy. He will be highly eclectic. 3
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE LAW
Probably 80 percent of all non-violent challenges to law or state
policy are totally "obedient"-distributing pamphlets on Vietnam or seg-
13. The following classical minutes of Quakers may be taken as partial statements
of this philosophy:
• . . The ideal Quaker method would seem to be patient waiting for enlighten-
ment on the underlying principle, which when seen is so absolutely clear and
convincing that no outer difficulties or suffering can affect it: its full im-
plications gradually appear, and its ultimate triumph can never be doubted.
Any advance towards it, may be accepted as a stepping stone, although only
methods consistent with Quaker ideals may be used to gain the desired end.
Doing anything tinged with evil, that good may come, is entirely contrary to
their ideas.
RUTH FRY, as quoted in INTRODUCTION TO NON-VIOLENCE 50, PACIFIST RESEARCH
BUREAU,
. . . Our reliance is not upon the power which dominates and coerces a man
but on spiritual forces-the irresistible power of goodness, and redemptive
power of suffering. We must trust the divine element in all men to accept our
faith in them and to respond in kind. We willingly assume the costs to our-
selves involved. For us the way of life must be not the sword, but the cross.
Five Years Meeting Minute, quoted by RUTH FREEMAN in QUAKERS AND PEACE 51,
PACIFIST RESEARCH BUREAU.
Albert Bigelow who sailed the "Golden Rule" into the Pacific nuclear test area in
protest said:
I am going in the hope of helping change the hearts and minds of men in
government. If necessary I am willing to give my life to help change a policy
of fear, force, and destruction to one of trust, kindness, and help. I am going
because I have to-if I am to call myself a human being.
BIGELOW, THE VOYAGE OF THE GOLDEN RULE 47 (1959).
The basic argument of pacificism was made long ago by Spinoza (Ethics), thus:
Hatred is increased 'by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be
destroyed by love. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love, passes into
love; and love is thereupon greater, than if hatred had not preceded it.
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regation, programs of voter registration, teach-ins, parades and picketing
under permits or where no permits are required, et cetera. The present
section of this paper does not deal with these cases, even though they
represent the real core of the civil rights-antiwar movement, because these
do not raise legal issues. When, however, a person challenges state law
or policy by violating a specific law, then we have a case of civil dis-
obedience, which presents certain legal problems.
There are those who tend to prejudge the whore issue of civil dis-
obedience by restricting its meaning to intentional violation of a law
already declared valid and controlling by the highest national authority.
Such a definition cannot be accepted, for it is far more narrow than
either the law or the practitioner of civil disobedience accepts.
In accepted legal terminology, I wish to suggest (1) that civil dis-
obedience is a recognized procedure for challenging law or policy and
obtaining court determination of the validity thereof; (2) that theories
of jurisprudence recognize the propriety of non-violent challenge to law
or policy; (3) that the obligation to obey the law is not absolute but
relative, and allows for some forms of such non-violent challenge;
(4) that protests and civil disobedience should receive protection under
the First Amendment; (5) that even if the act of protest or disobedience
is found to be a technical violation of law, the purpose of the disobedience
should cause the punishment to be nominal (certainly not more severe).
(1) Procedure is the body of rules for testing substantive rights.
In law we recognize that a right (interest) without a procedure to protect
it is no right at all. What we need to recall is that "civil disobedience"
is one of the best accepted legal procedures. Let me illustrate:
Our tax law requires one to report fairly his income and pay his
taxes-all his taxes. But the law in this instance gives him a procedural
choice to determine whether the State's command raust be obeyed. He
may either refuse to pay (civil disobedience actually encouraged by stat-
ute) and go into the deficiency procedure and Tax Court, or he may pay
(comply) and sue for a refund in the Court of Claims or District Court.
A fairly similar procedural recognition is Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act."'
Further, in a very real sense every person who violates a contract
and litigates its meaning and legality, every business that suppresses
competition and determines the issue in an anti-trust suit, every individual
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 203, 78 Stat. 244 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2
(1964): no person shall "punish or attempt to punish any per3on for exercising or at-
tempting to exercise any right" protected by the act. The Supreme Court has said that
"nonforcible attempts to gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered by the
Act, are immunized from prosecution," Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311
(1964).
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who continues to use a right-of-way his neighbor would close, every
unauthorized user of a trade-mark or copyright or patent, every violator
of a rule or order of the FCC or any other administrative agency-is
engaged in civil disobedience as a procedure for testing the legality of
state action or rule that he finds unacceptable.
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to protect a person from
criminal prosecution when he advocates violating a criminal law to test
its validity (alleged to be invalid for discrimination). This is not unlike
the issue which many of the Vietnam and draft demonstrators raise in
asserting that the Vietnamese war is violative of international law and
that they cannot be forced into war and violation of Nuremberg law.
In Keegan v. United States,5 a member of the German-American Bund
counselled evasion (refusal) of military service on the theory that when
section 308(i) of 50 U.S.C. took away the rights of Bund members to
certain jobs this was unjust discrimination against American citizens
rendering unconstitutional the application of Selective Service to them;
the Bund wanted a test case. In holding that an acquittal should have
been directed, as requested, the Court in part said:
. . . One with innocent motives, who honestly believes a law is
unconstitutional and, therefore, not obligatory, may well counsel
that the laws shall not be obeyed; that its command shall be
resisted until a court shall have held it valid, but this is not
knowingly counseling, stealthily and by guile, to evade its
command."8
The same principle was applied and the Keegan case relied on in
Okamoto v. United States." There, Japanese-Americans who had been
evacuated from the west coast into internment camps decided that they
should not serve in the army under Selective Service, the theory being that
while in custody of the government in these camps persons were not sub-
ject to Selective Service and that the law, if so applied, would be uncon-
stitutional. This is similar to the argument of some protestors and draft
demonstrators who insist that when Selective Service begins classifying
them 1-A because they protest foreign policy this is a discriminatory appli-
cation and therefore unconstitutional so they are entitled to disobey. One
hundred and one law professors have sanctioned this argument in a letter
to President Johnson."8 In conscientious objector and other draft cases
15. 325 U.S. 487 (1945).
16. Id. at 493-94.
17. 152 F.2d 905 (1945).
18. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1965. See also, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). It involved an ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco making it
unlawful to operate a laundry without the consent of the board of supervisors unless it
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the Supreme Court has explicitly required the draftee who considers he
has illegally been classified to appear at the induction center and there
disobey the law (refuse induction) as the procedure to challenge the
classification as illegal (as a defense in his criminal prosecution)."9
Nor does it seem to this writer to be a valid position to suggest that
once the highest court holds a law constitutional the right of disobedience
ceases. This would freeze as permanent law the Dred Scott,2" Plessy,"1
Macintosh,22 and countless other decisions, which have since been reversed.
I have not heard anyone suggest that southern officials who attempt to
test again and again the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education,2" or
Baker v. Carr,24 or NAACP v. Alabama,2  or the Civil Rights cases of
1883"0 are to be punished for what is ultimately found to be "civil dis-
obedience" by them.27
(2) Jurisprudence or Legal Theory. There are two theories here-
one a very ancient one, and the other a recent one in whose formulation
I have led and which I believe the United States Supreme Court is in the
process of adopting. The first theory is that of natural law or the higher
law. This theory has kept rulers "under the law," has met political crisis,
has founded itself in Logos or divine law and has allowed man to chal-
lenge the illegality of a law. When Antigone insisted upon burying her
brother despite the king's edict that his body be cast to the dogs; when
Christians refused to pay homage to Caesar's image with incense and
wine; when Aquinas insisted that "human law does not bind a man in
was located in a building constructed of brick or stone. Yick Wo and his associates
were convicted of violating this ordinance. In fact the consent of the supervisors was
withheld from some two hundred Chinese, while eighty others, not Chinese, were per-
mitted to carry on the business under the same conditions. Reversing, the Supreme
Court said: ". . . though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yut, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the Constitution ... "
19. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1965); Estnp v. United States, 327
U.S. 114 (1946) ; Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1943).
20. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
23. 347 U.S. 438, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. 357 U.S. 449 (1959).
26. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
27. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) ; Fortson vs. Toombs,
379 U.S. 621 (1965) ; Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965) ; Parsons v. Buckley, 379
U.S. 359 (1965); Roberts v. Steel, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; Calhoun
v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964) ; Griffin v. County School Bd. ot Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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conscience . . . [and if they conflict] human law should not be obeyed;"
when the American colonies declared their independence of England be-
cause "all men are created equal, [that they are] endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness ;" when the Supreme Court recognizes in con-
science a "duty to a power higher than the State"-they relied upon a
higher law, a natural justice, a code of man's fundamental rights which
no political power can eliminate. And this is in the American tradition."
The second theory is that non-violent revolution is within the law.
From the late 1940's on, I have urged this position in briefs before the
Supreme Court and in articles.29 In 1961, in my book Dear Mr. Presi-
28. See Girourard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946) ; Corwin, The 'Higher
Law Background of Ainerican Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 149 (1928) ; Free-
man, Exemptions from Civil Responsibilities, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 437 (1959) ; Freeman, A
Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 UNIv. OF PENN. L. REv. 806 (1957-58); Freeman,
Civil Liberties-Acid Test of Democracy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 511 (1959).
THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1960) nicely formulated the problem:
Unjust laws exist. Shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor
to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress
them at once?
His answer was:
If this injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government,
let it go, let it go; perchance it will wear smooth . . . but if it is of such a
nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say,
break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine.
BUCHANAN, REDISCOVERING NATURAL LAW (1962) has added another dimension:
Laws are questions asked by God, history, nature, or society to be answered
by men individually and collectively. This formulation penetrates the heart
of human freedom. It says that no law, not even divine law, cancels out human
freedom; the answer can be Yes or No or something else. It also tactitly
warns of consequences of the answer. But primarily it forces the human being
to think about ends, or purposes.
See specifically Civil Disobedience: M. R. MacGuigan, Civil Disobedience and
Natural Law, 11 CATH. LAW 118 (1965) ; M. Keeton, Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43
TEX. L. REv. 507 (1965); Harris Wofford, The Law and Civil Disobedience, 142
PRESBYTERIAN OUTLOOK # 34.
29. See note 28, supra. My formulation in DEAR MR. PRESIDENT (1961) is as
follows:
More and more legal theoreticians and courts are recognizing that violence
is necessarily outside the law, violative of law and order, destructive of com-
munity. Thomas Jefferson to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no right
(judicially approved) of violent revolution. Violence has become so threatening
and destructive that it can no longer be a tool of bargaining, or a tool of social
change. But, it would be an immoral society in which no method existed by
which change could be produced, 'by which the status quo could be made to
respond to revolutionary demands. But non-violence is within the law, builds
community and seeks to persuade and gain acceptance by democratic methods
similar to free speech. If armaments and violence can no longer be tolerated
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dent, an Open Letter on Foreign Policy, I pointed out that the world is
being shaped by ten revolutions including "the non-violent revolution
which is demonstrating that political change (India) and social change
(southern U.S.) can and must be achieved by non-violence." Recently,
at the Pacem in Terris World Convocation, Arnold Toynbee and Senator
Fulbright, in discussing the right of emergent peoples to revolutionary
wars or "wars of liberation," stated that the Twentieth Century recog-
nized the right of revolution but not of violent revoltt'on, that wherever
an order under law was established the right of violence is lost and is
replaced only with the right of non-violent change."0
It seems to me that the Supreme Court was trying to commit itself
to this theory when in Dennis v. United States it stated:
The obvious purpose of the statute [Smith Act] is to protect
existing Government, not from change by peaceful, lawful and
constitutional means, but from change by violence, revolution
and terrorism.3
(3) The Obligation to Obey the Law is often stated in absolute
terms. But the above examples contradict this. It is sometimes stated
in prima facie terms. I would conclude that duty to obey the law must
actually be presented in relativist terms."2 The law clearly recognizes
because of their danger to society, non-violence steps up to offer its services to
make power understand the demands which must be met if community is to be
built.
.30. FULBRIGHT, PACEM IN TuuIs 206 (1965):
The status quo cannot be frozen, and we ought not to tr3 to freeze it.
What we have to do is not to try to stop change, but to try to carry out the
inevitable changes without violence and bloodshed. . . . We are now in the
atomic age, and so we cannot survive if we continue to carry out our changes
by the old senseless and barbarous method of resorting to force.
TOYNBEE, Id. at 219-20:
Gandhi . . . was the prophet of the atomic age. Life is change, and now
change is going to be faster and more furious than ever. 3ut we have to have
it without violence. Gandhi showed that it was possible ...
31. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951). See atlso, Rowoldt v. Perfetto,
355 U.S. 115 (1957) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). It seems to this writer
that this is the basis of the distinction between upholding the registration provisions of the
Subversive Activities Control Act as to the Communist Party and an active officer
thereof, but not as to others. See, Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. S.A.C.B.,
380 U.S. 513 (1965); Am. Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. S.A.C.B., 380
U.S. 503 (1905) ; Communist Party of the United States v. S.A.C.B., 309 U.S. 1 (1961).
32. For the various viewpoints, see, Symposium-Civil D2sobedience and the Law,
3 Aiu. Cma x. L.Q. 11 (1964); Tweed, Segal and Packer, Civil Rights and Disobedience
to Law: A Lawyer's View, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 290 (1964); Waldman, Civil Rights-yes:
Civil Disobcdience-no, 37 N.Y.S.B.J. 331 (1965) ; Wasserstrom, The Obligation to
Obey the Law, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 780 (1963).
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distinctions in motivation, or lack of motivation (insanity, in the course
of a felony, premeditated). The cases we have examined above are only
a few recognizing some relative right of civil disobedience.
Let us examine civil disobedience and the duty/non-duty of obeying
the law on logical-ethical grounds:
a) It is often argued that whatever is illegal is also immoral. Illegal-
ity equals immorality. Law governs morality. But this argument presents
us with conflict of two moralities. That which was moral, prior the law,
is faced with the new moral that "What is legal is moral." When two
morals conflict it is generally recognized that the higher morality must
control. This puts us back again to the relativist view of civil disobedi-
ence.
b) A second argument would be that obedience to law is just a matter
of law (omits morals). What is illegal is illegal. The law creates its
own duty. This view is essentially totalitarian. This argument takes no
account of morals or "higher law" obligations. Here we have a hierarchy
of obligations question. And on both this and the former point the
Supreme Court has recognized some "duty to a power higher than the
State.Y
3 3
c) In order to state all of the logical alternatives one would have to
recognize the argument that no act which is moral can be illegal (or the
obverse: no act which is immoral can be legal). Morality equals legality.
Morality governs law. This need not be labored. It is the "higher law"
and Aquinas' argument. It is clearly relativist and puts morality in the
driver's seat.
d) A fourth position would be Scott Buchanan's that a law is never
really a command but only a question-"shall you obey the law; will you
obey the law?" Some of course answer-I'll hide my disobedience
(speeding) and not get caught; others may try automatically to obey all
laws, questioning none (lawyers would find this group small). With the
two above groups we are not now concerned, for we are saying here that
civil disobedience is intentional action for ulterior reasons or goals. There
are at least three positions for those who rationally weigh their response
to a particular law. They may feel that everyone would agree that the
act should be prohobited-and they will not disobey the law. They may
feel that this law, relating it to all laws, is unclear; and they may obey or
disobey the law as a procedure to test the law or get a new interpretation,
the new interpretation thus becoming "law," so that they have in fact
complied. Or a person may decide to disobey the law, as a democratic
technique, an appeal to his peers. This may be inside or outside of legal
33. Girourard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).
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procedures. He is saying: if "they" (the public, the district attorney, the
court) agree with me, I am justified; if they disagree with me I am
ready to pay the penalty.
e) This "democracy" argument can be expanded into a fifth posi-
tion. One side would argue that "whatever is democratically enacted
must be obeyed" (51 percent or majority enacted, 49 percent or minority
bound). The opposing side would argue that democracy is precisely the
place where civil disobedience by a minority should be employed to ask
for consideration of laws. Since ill-conceived or immoral laws do in
fact get enacted, any minority (as Justice Douglas says, even the minor-
ity of one) has all the extended rights of free speech (picketing, sit-ins,
demonstrations) to ask for reconsideration. A rule that disobedience is
never justified would deaden both moral and democratic sensitivity and
prevent legal change.
f) It must also be recognized that many laws are disobeyed in an-
other sense: that they are "not complied with," withortt any active concern
by the State. The law says that a will must be executed before two
witnesses, that an affidavit must be made before a notary, etc. The
effect of non-compliance is that the law does not protect you. There are
also times when a law may be disobeyed but no sanction is provided; it is
brutumn fulnen. There are times when what seems illegal is not really
illegal (for example, conflicting laws). This latter is the argument of
the sit-ins-there may have been a technical trespass under local law, but
if the proper law (no discrimination) were applied, there would be no
law violation.
g) Finally, we may very briefly examine two of the most frequently
made arguments against civil disobedience (each needs much more exten-
sive treatment, here we can make only an outline). The first argument
is: It would be disastrous if everyone disobeyed law. This is a typically
illogical argument from specific to general. The civil disobedient is not
urging disobedience of all laws. I regularly prove in civil disobedience
cases that this client obeys laws-has never violated another. He is
willing that anyone disobey this particular law he believes to be immoral.
He would never argue that one disobedience justified all disobedience.
Nor is there the slightest proof that others are caused to violate law by
this disobedience or that any ordinary law violator cares a whit about this
violation. In fact, conscientious objectors in prison have found the con-
trary." The other argument is: He who takes the benefits of society
must bear the obligations of society. To some degree this phrasing can
be turned into a justification for civil disobedience (as it was by the
34. SIBLEY & JACOBS, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE (1952).
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American colonies: "no taxation without representation"). What of the
young, the poor, the disenfranchised, the dispossessed? In effect they
are saying: you ask me to be drafted and fight a war when I have no
place in the decision process, to protect a system that provides me with
no bread, to respect a legal system which consistently protects to me no
rights? Sir, this is a two way street. You ask me to obey duties without
rights; I demand rights and only then can I be expected to adhere freely
to duties. Is not the "benefits" argument an immoral and illogical one
to the extent of our failure to fulfill these needs? Is it not a case of bad
conscience?
(4) First Amendment Rights as Protecting Cuiil Disobedience. This
article offers neither the time nor space to discuss fully the concept of
the first amendment as an affirmative doctrine of truth in the market-
place intended to challenge and change government action or policy.
Alexander Meiklejohn and others have stated this view.35 I shall here
give the merest outline of the case material. From the dissenting opinion
in Abram v. United States (1919)" to the latest statement in Cox v. Lou-
isian&3 and Garrison v. Louisiana (1965)8 the Supreme Court has issued
a ringing affirmation of truth in the marketplace as the philosophy and
core of democracy and first amendment protection. The following
shortened version, taken from seven Supreme Court decisions," could be
enlarged to over twenty pages from as many decisions:
Freedom of expression is the well-spring of our civiliza-
tion. The basis of the first amendment is the hypothesis that
speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda,
free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental
policies. Full and free discussion keeps a society from becoming
stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains that work
to tear all civilization apart.
Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of
our faith. Its protection is essential to the very existence of a
35. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877 (1963) ; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central
Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191; Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
36. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
37. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
38. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
39. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (majority and dissenting opinions);
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ; Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949); West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (concurring opinion); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (dissenting
opinion).
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democracy. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity
of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions
that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
The interest, which (the first amendment) guards, and
which gives it its importance, presupposes that there are no
orthodoxies-religious, political, economic, or scientific-which
are immune from debate and dispute.
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute.
Under the first amendment the public has a right to every
man's views and every man the right to speak them.
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties;
and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means in-
dispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion wiould be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protec-
tion against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should b2 a fundamental
principle of the American government.
Finally, this freedom to differ is not limited to things that
do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom.
The test of its substance is the right to differ zs to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word o:" act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an excep-
tion, they do not now occur to us.
In Musser v. Utah, the Court squarely considered the right to ad-
vocate lawbreacking, as follows:
In the abstract the problem could be solved in various ways. At
one extreme it could be said that society can best protect itself
by prohibiting only the substantive evil and relying on a com-
pletely free interchange of ideas as the best safeguard against
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demoralizing propaganda. Or we might permit advocacy of
lawbreaking, but only so long as the advocacy falls short of
incitement. But the other extreme position, that the state imay
prevent any conduct which induces people to violate the law, or
any advocacy of unlawful activity, cannot be squared with the
First Amendment.40
This is merely one application of the "clear and present danger" and
"fighting words" rule of the Supreme Court.' If recruiting members
for the Communist Party (Herndon v. Lowry), if publicly advocating
polygamy (Musser v. Utah), if playing anti-Catholic records in streets
where 90 percent of the people were Catholic (Cantwell v. Connecticut),
if condemning the war and draft and distributing literature to this effect
to parents of draftees during the war (Taylor v. Mississippi), if refusal
to salute the flag during the war when great national solidarity was
sought (West Virginia v. Barnette) do not show a clear and present
danger, how can the activity of demonstrators for civil rights, Vietnam
policy, and free speech present a threat of clear and present danger to the
nation? The clear and present danger test has been summarized thus:
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger"
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport
to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected
expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a
minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First
Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be
taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language,
read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.12
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, in upholding demonstra-
tions, strikes and like action the Court said:
: * * But the protection they sought was not solely for persons
in intellectual pursuits. It extends to more than abstract dis-
cussion, unrelated to action. The First Amendment is a charter
40. 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
41. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ; United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106 (1948); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Contwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
42. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
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for government, not for an institution of learnirg. "Free trade
in ideas" means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to
action, not merely to describe facts. . . . Indeed, the whole
history of the problem shows it is to the end of preventing
action that repression is primarily directed and to preserving
the right to urge it that the protections are given." 3
This rule moved one further step in the cases as to parade permits,
use of parks and streets. The net effect of a whole series of cases is that,
if the parks or streets are used by others for similar purposes, no free
speech group can be barred from like use. Thus no prior restraint may
be put on the use of a public park or street. Nor can conditions to the
use of public places be attached that are in effect a denial of their use.
Permits to use public parks or places must be granted without discrimina-
tion. The normal methods of use are allowed (including loud speakers),
subject to regulation to prevent undue disturbance.4" Within the past
year the Supreme Court has clearly recognized sit-ins and mass demon-
strations for Negro and civil rights and protected those engaged.4"
The Court has also several times stated that there is a distinction
between violation of law where a third person is injured and one where
merely the State is incommoded, and has required the State to adjust
itself to the citizens' conscience and first amendmert interests.4" Their
opinions have referred to the fact that disobedience by Quakers and
43. 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1944). See also, Herndon v. Lowry, slepra note 41.
44. See, e.g., Flower v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) ; Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) ; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Snyder v. Milwaukee, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1933). See also, Annot., 10
A.L.R. 2d 627 (1950) ; Note, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1234 (1953).
45. See, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559 (1965) ; Hairm v. City of Rock Hill,
379 U.S. 306 (1964).
46. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In 319 U.S. at 630 the United
States Supreme Court said:
The freedom asserted by these appellees does not brin:- them into collision
with rights asserted by any other individual. . . . The refusal of these persons
to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others
to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable
and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual.
Also in Girourard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), the United States Supreme Court
stated at 328 U.S. 68 that:
. . . The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an
effort to accommodate the demands of the State to th,- conscience of the
individual. The Rights recognized that in the domain of conscience there is a
moral power higher than the State. Throughout the ages, men have suffered
death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the
State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product
of that struggle.
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others was what produced the first amendment freedoms. In the light
of this, the famous 1948 "Declaration of Conscience" by Quakers against
the Draft Act, must be kept in mind and compared to the present Stu-
dents for Democratic Society stand. 7  There are other writers beginning
to approach this concept of the place of civil disobedience in the First
Amendment.4"
There is thus a strong case for the protection of protests, demonstra-
tions-of civil disobedience-tunder the first amendment."
Though I do not desire to press this too far I think it is worth noting
that in three constitutions which the United States prepared after the
war 0 and in Socialist-Communist countries, where you might least expect
to find it,"' provisions exist guaranteeing free discussion and communica-
tion including specifically the right of mass demonstration. Is our at-
home democratic theory anything less?
(5) Punishment for Civil Disobedience Should at Most be Nominal.
Gandhi insisted (because of his emphasis on "sacrifice") that a civil
disobedient must be willing to pay the "penalty" and many civil dis-
obedience theorists (particularly pacifists) have required this quality to
assure keeping the motives "pure." For this purpose I understand the
argument. But I cannot, as it relates to the theory of government and
the courts. It is possible that society is afraid enough of full exercise of
first amendment rights, of civil disobedience, of challenge of law, as to
require that well-motivated disobedients be held technically to have vio-
lated the law. But I cannot see any reason for jail sentences, or sentences
more severe than for those who challenge law for other reasons or as
47. [We] support Young Friends and others who express their opposition to
conscription either by non-registration, or by registration as conscientious
objectors. We warmly approve civil disobedience under Divine compulsion as
an honorable testimony fully in keeping with the history and practices of Friends.
48. C. L. Black, Problems of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with American
Institutions of Government, 43 TEx. L. Rrv. 492 (1965); Cohn, The Firstness of the
First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464, 478 (1957) ; Van Alstyne, Student Academic Free-
doma; some Constitutional Considerations, 2 L. IN TRA s. 1 (1965); BICKEL, POLITICS OF
THE WAUPEN COURT 175 (1965) ; Cohen, Law, Speech and Disobedience, NATION, March
28, 1966, p. 357.
49. I do not read Justice Black's dissent in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 at 575
(1965) as contrary: (1) he was placing limits on and permitting regulation of picketing
a courthouse in such a way as to prevent the fair administration of justice, (2) cautioning
minorities of dangers to themselves from demonstrations, (3) recalling his own early
experience with demonstrations against his appointment. Any other interpretation would
be contrary to his familiar position. See, Justice Black and the First Amendment
'Absolutes': a Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549 (1962).
50. Constitution of Japan (1946) art. 16; Constitution of Italy (1947) art. 21;
Constitution of Germany (1949) art. 9.
51. Constitution of Indonesia (1950) art. 21; Constitution of China (1947) art. 2;
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (1936) art. 125.
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part of normal criminal intent. Yet that is exactly the general practice. 2
It is usual to take motive into account in sentencing, and I believe the
essentially "democratic" or "first amendment" motive should incur
nominal penalties at the most.
IN CONCLUSION
There has always existed a problem of the exact frame of reference
in which society recognizes any civil liberty, such as civil disobedience.
The minimum would be tolerance, or forbeararce without approval.
This is reflected in Judge Learned Hand's words (The Spirit of Liberty,
p. 71) : "Liberty is so much latitude as the powerful choose to accord the
weak." A slightly greater recognition would be peaceful coexistence,
which is stated in Kant's words (Metaphysik der Sitten) : "Every action
is right which, or according to the maxim of which, the freedom of will
of each can coexist with the freedom of everyone according to a general
law." A third might phrase it as Christian charity: Love the person
himself but disapprove his errors or folly (and try to convert him); as
Wordsworth said: "By discipline of time made wise, we learn to tolerate
the infirmities and faults of others." Finally, society might take the
position that the individual has a right of dissent (and civil disobedience)
because of the advantages accruing to society from free and open discus-
sion. Here "tolerance" becomes "justified"-i.e. "juridified" on prin-
ciple.
Let all at least tolerate "civil disobedience;" let those who can grant
it a legal right, for which this paper may be a partial brief."
ADDENDUM
The New Movement(s) of Nonviolence and Civil Disobedience.
In a very real sense there is only one movement, yet there are enough
differences in goals, leadership, and membership that to clarify our dis-
cussion it can be separated into two segments. One is the Negro-civil
rights movement, which may be accurately described in terms of the
organizational names which comprise it: CORE (Congress of Racial
Equality); SCLS (Southern Christian Leadership Conference); SNCC
(Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee); NAACP (National As-
52. See notes 21-27, supra and Sibley & Jacobs, note 41 s tpra.
53. The reader's attention should be drawn to the possible implications of Brown
v. Louisiana, 34 U.S.L. Week 4143 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1966) whkh was decided after Dr.
Freeman's article was written. Mr. Justice Fortas announcing the judgment of the
Court stated at 34 U.S.L. Week 4146 that ". . . the statute [Louisiana breach of peace
statute] was deliberately and purposefully applied solely to terminate the reasonable,
orderly, and limited exercise of the right to protest the unconstitutional segregation of a
public facility. Interference with this right, so exercised, by state action is intolerable
under our Constitution." [Emphasis added] Articles Editor.
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sociation for Advancement of Colored People); MFDP (Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party); COFO (SNCC, SCLC, CORE). The
second is the Student-antiwar movement, which again may be character-
ized by the organizational names: SDS (Students for Democratic So-
ciety); VDC (Vietnam Day Committee); SNCC (Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee); SPU (Student Peace Union); NSM (North-
ern Student Movement). There are peripheral organizations, some
Marxist, some temporary, such as FSM (Free Speech Movement, Berk-
eley), May 2nd Movement and Dubois Clubs (Marxist), YSL and YSA
(Young Socialists).
Outside both movements, but at times adding "oldsters" to the
demonstrations, are old line peace and civil rights groups. The chief
issues between this "outside" and the movement are: must the peace and
betterment movements operate within the mainstream of American
political life; must they make an alliance with older ages and with labor
and liberals; must they accept or develop an ideology and organization
structure ?
Let us see whether we can place the movement in perspective.
Immediately after the war the returning veterans began a great liberal
tradition on the campuses: Amvets, Students for Peace, CORE, etc.
This was destroyed by McCarthyism of the 1950's. Though CORE,
NAACP, SCLC were earlier active ii school desegregation, the New
Movement actually began with SNCC sit-ins in 1960, passed through
SPU ban-the-bomb marches of 1961, through voter registration and
candidates for office in 1962 into the total Negro-civil rights and student-
free speech-antiwar activities of 1963-65.
The 1960's abounded with issues calling forth protest: House Un-
American Activities Committee hearings in San Francisco, atmospheric
nuclear testing, four young North Carolina Negroes' demand for service
at a public lunch counter, the Cuban revolution and counter-revolution,
the murder of Evers and Moore and three SNCC workers and Mrs. Liuz-
zo and Rev. Reib and scores of others, Tuskaloosa and Selma, college
desegregation at Alabama and Georgia and 01' Miss, police brutality and
riots from Harlem to Watts, the seating of delegates at the Democratic
Convention and in Congress, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. The
Civil Rights portion of the movement has had remarkable success in
obtaining official concessions-two civil rights bills, a poverty program
-and thus the sting has been taken out of their struggle, which has gone
into the courts and to some degree off the streets. The protest has
therefore swung over to the peace issue (Vietnam) at the most crucial
time, challenging the national administration at the very core of the exist-
ing order.
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One can describe fairly completely the nature of the movement and
its participants. The movement is politically existential, facing whatever
problems currently confront it. It is participatory democracy, trying to
count personally against the alienated, consensus, power elite, military-
industrial politics of Dahl, Lipset, Bell, Mills, Rossiter, and Hacker. It
is non-violent primarily as a matter of technique rather than theory. It
is moralistic, seeing all problems in black and white, and trying to act
morally. It takes a One World view and seeks a world conscience. It
uses "umbrella" issues on which divergent views will cooperate (e.g., "end
the war in Vietnam"). It works with anyone; it does not bother about
a "united," "common" or "popular" front; its policy is non-exclusion.
It sees anti-communism as McCarthyism revived. It lacks continuity
with progressive literature and art of the past; it creates its own. It
adopts a new and simple language able to "gut" with people. It has a
"style" in clothes and demeanor. It is a crusade for the unrepresented
and dispossessed. It distrusts piecemeal solutions--"operations head-
start," "poverty programs," "voting rights bills" os compromising the
broad revolution. It demands of its members to prove themselves by
laying their bodies on the line.
Who are these participants? They are young: believing that youth
have common and unique problems, distrusting anyone over 30, seeing
students as the educated vanguard-as yet unbought by the system. They
come from the upper middle class; they are the brightest and most com-
mitted of their generation. They seek individualism, dignity, how to get
control of their own lives. They reject the affluent society, though most
are supported by it; they see the "poor" as least corrupted. They tend to
be bohemian. They mistrust government and when police beat them,
mayors refuse permits, and courts cheat them, they ,eel that their case is
proved.
The Negro-Civil Rights Movement. Can best be separately con-
sidered by looking at CORE and SNCC. Both have become Negro
organizations, with Negro staffs, Negro leadership, Negro local workers
and pride in Negro identity. Both have become large, with perhaps 1,500
paid and unpaid full time workers, with budgets totalling two to three
million dollars, with political power. Charismatic figures like Farmer
and King play key roles. The participants come less from the upper
middle class. They are founded in and their demands tend to come from
the grass roots of the dispossessed. The leadership is doctrinaire pacifist
(Rustin, Farmer, Randolph, King) and their cadres come from the town
Negroes who have always practiced "necessitous" non-violence. It is
easy for them to identify the "us" (colored) and the "they" (whites).
The people asked to parade and picket can see themselves as personally
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profiting from the sought change. They have not had to battle merely
"issues" but have achieved direct confrontation in jails and lunchrooms,
at the barricades and voter registration tables, before burning crosses and
cattle prods, in the policy system and vigilante terror. They have been
successful, like "an idea whose time has come." And with success has
come less purity: need for "establishment" money, bureaucratic organiza-
tion, compromise in politics, unwillingness to take on the war-peace issue
(e.g. CORE and NAACP-though King as an individual has).
Vann Woodward in the New York Times has remarked: "in judg-
ing the progress of a revolution, much depends on whether the bottle is
seen as half full or half empty; whether one concentrates on what has
been done or what remains to be done." The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, have gone about as far as federal
statutes can to make the Negro a citizen; school desegregation is moving
slowly to make him educated; poverty programs are a start to reach him
economically. But there is a rapid expansion of de facto segregation, a
widening of the gap of unemployment between Negro and white, a de-
terioration of living conditions, a wiping out by automation of normally
Negro jobs. And over it all hangs the American myth that when given
the vote, the voter can cure his own ills. The Negro rights movement
has a long road ahead; it may have diminishing public support; it may
use increasing civil disobedience. I cannot help but remember that
W.E.B. DuBois opened this century with the words: "The problem of
the twentieth century is the color problem,"1 and that in 1942 was issued
a pamphlet, "Civil Disobedience-is it the answer to Jim Crow ?"
The Student Anti-war Movement. The best way to present this
movement is to let it present itself-in its own words, in the famous 1962
Port Huron Founding Statement of SDS, and the very recent (Octo-
ber 20, 1965) Statement of Paul Booth, SDS National Secretary:
On Politics: The American political system . . . frustrates
democracy by confusing the individual citizen, paralyzing policy
discussion, and consolidating the irresponsible power of military
and business interests.
On Society: We would replace power rooted in possession,
privilege, or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in
love, reflectiveness, reason and creativity.
On Communism: As democrates we are in basic opposition to
the communist system. . . . [But] democracy, we are con-
vinced, requires every effort to set in peaceful opposition the
basic viewpoints of the day. ...
1. DuBois, TEE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903).
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On Foreign Policy: The world is in transformation. But
America is not.. . . Fed by a bellicose press, manipulated by
economic and political opponents of change, drifting in their
own history, [the American people] grumble about "the foreign
aid waste," or about "that beatnick down in Cuba," or how
"things will get us by. .... "
On the Economy: We hear glib references to the "welfare state,"
"free enterprise," and "shareholder's democracy" while military
defense is the main item of "public" spending and obvious
oligopoly and other forms of minority rule defy real individual
initiative or popular control.
On Man1 : We regard man as infinitely precicus and possessed
of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love ...
We oppose the depersonalization that reduces human beings to
the status of things-if anything, the brutalities of the twentieth
century teach that means and ends are intimately related, that
vague appeals to "posterity" cannot justify present mutilations.
Port Huron, 1962.
Students for a Democratic Society wishes to reiterate
emphatically its intention to pursue its opposition to the war in
Viet-Nam ...
We feel that the war is immoral at its root, that it is fought
alongside a regime with no claim to represent its people, and
that it is foreclosing the hope of making America a decent and
truly Democratic Society.
The commitment of SDS, and of the whole generation we
represent, is clear: we are anxious to build villages; we refuse
to burn them. We are anxious to help and to change our
country; we refuse to destroy someone else's country. We are
anxious to advance the cause of democracy; we do not believe
that cause can be advanced by torture and terror.
We are fully prepared to volunteer for service to our
country and to democracy. . . we propose to the President that
all those Americans who seek so vigorously to build instead of
burn be given their chance to do so . . . let us see what happens
if service to democracy is made grounds for exemption from the
military draft. I predict that almost every member of my gen-
eration would choose to build, not to burn; to teach, not to
torture; to help, not to kill.
Our generation is not afraid of service for long years and
low pay; SDS has been working for years in the slums of
America at $10 a week to build a movement for democracy
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there. 'We are not afraid to risk our lives; we have been risking
our lives in Mississippi and Alabama, and some of us died there.
But we will not bomb the people, the women and children of
another country.
Until the President agrees to our proposal, we have only
one choice: we do in conscience object, utterly and wholeheart-
edly, to this war; and we will encourage every member of our
generation to object, and to file his objection through the Form
150 provided by the law for conscientious objection.
SDS, October 20, 1965.
This segment of the movement contains some different emphases
from that of the Negro-civil rights segment. First, the student move-
ment is less organized and less doctrinaire. It is not in face-to-face
confrontation with an opponent, as the Negro is; it is facing issues. One
of the student gripes and bases for action is that the universities isolate
them from real situations and that they must break out of this and gain
confrontation-the task is more difficult. This segment tackles bigger
game, for no game is bigger than the Army, the President and Foreign
Policy. It is difficult to gain step-by-step concrete results, and when
some progress is not shown it is hard to maintain commitment. The
ideals of the Negro-civil rights segment are old American ideals (equality,
voting rights, etc.), but the ideals of the student movement are only now
forming out of the action itself and are more difficult to grasp ("personal
integrity," "participatory democracy," "intellectual responsibility," etc.).
SDS works on the camptses, where they seek to make education respon-
sible and to establish a community in which they feel citizenship, and
through ERAP or community organization of the poor as "politics from
the bottom up," a counter-community to the present power structure.
SDS has had some success in changing universities for the better. It has
had little success with its community organizations. This movement does
not want to overturn democracy but to achieve it; it is strong on "par-
ticipatory" democracy. This student movement is not "churchy" and
definitely not puritan (as much of the Negro-civil rights group is) ; it is
laughter and dance, and community and fraternity, and sex and spon-
taneity and love. It increasingly sees civil rights and poverty programs
as palliatives-too little and too late. It sees the liberals bought off by
these and turned against the students to smother their revolutionary
spirit and their method of demonstration. The students are painfully
aware that going to jail is more damaging to them than to other Negro-
civil rights protestors; that their case is not a great popular cause as civil
rights has in some aspects turned out to be. The Draft and the Draft
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card issue is only one way to find real confrontation, a situation touching
both the individual and society deeply.
Wfhat Do I See For the Movement Ahead? For the first time we
have in this country a mass non-violent movement. It has little faith in
traditional political coalitions to accomplish revolutionary change or save
us from nuclear annihilation. It is a new elite finding a broader popular
support. The students and the younger faculty are welding themselves
into the most intelligent criticism of government yet formed, and they
have sufficient contacts through real sacrifice to draw on the Negro,
middle city, white poor, lower middle class. The movement will increas-
ingly attempt to reconstitute American university education and to utilize
the university in launching new political-social action. Some members
will go in and out of the Poverty Program, Peace Corps, Voter Regis-
tration; and some will refuse to serve in the armed forces-on conscience
or other grounds.
Will the movement be able to furnish America with a conscience?
Ralph Templin, in his book said: "democracy can be realized or destroyed
only by its defense or its betrayal in its place of inner integrity: the
conscience of man." 2  Liberation called for the movement "to fill the
jails and provide this nation with the slap of conscience it so desperately
needs." 3  In a 1959 law review article, I gave the history of protection
of conscience as the means of furnishing the State with a conscience.' I
know the movement will try, but I do not know vNhether it can furnish
America with a conscience.
James Wilson' has outlined some of the requirements for successful
protest-the protestant must feel strongly what he has to say, this must
be shared widely in society, or it must be so dynamic as to educate the
public to a new and unheld position, it must move in the general direction
true to the society, the protest object must be clear, it must not use in-
appropriate methods. My own judgment is that the movement fairly
well understands these problems.
The movement will have to face one of the most difficult issues in
civil disobedience. There are those who argue that in a power centered
society, non-violence by itself is rarely able to produce results-that it is
the latent, incipient, potential violence which in fact makes the non-
violent argument effective. In most moves for haman betterment two
revolutions are in fact preached-one of ends and one of means (e.g.
non-violence). One of these may come through to a listening person
2. TEmPLIN, DEM1OCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE 176 (1965).
3. LIBERATION, October, 1965, p. 10.
4. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Consdence, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 106 (1959).
5. Wilson, The Strategy of Protest, 5 J. CONF. REs. 291-303 (1961).
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loud and clear for he is intellectually and emotionally tuned to the needed
change (equality, jobs, school, public places, justice, votes). But he may
not be equally attuned to the method. I think the student movement will
remain non-violent in the face of awful provocation. I do not know
whether the Negro movement can. On the one side of the balance is the
long history of Negro non-violence and a strong pacifist leadership; on
the negative side is the poverty, injustice, police and civilian brutality of
the section in which the Negro is brought up. I hope for this great
period of change to be achieved non-violently. But I cannot escape the
very real chance of non-violence escalating into violence and the neces-
sity of society being understanding and tolerant. -
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